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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Husband and Wife - Wife
Held Secondarily Liable for Necessary Expenses. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326
(1982).
In Marshfield Clinic v. Discher I the Wisconsin Supreme
Court completed the trilogy begun with Sharpe Furniture,
Inc. v. Buckstaff2 and Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hospital of Franciscan Sisters,3 concerning a husband's and
wife's individual liability for debts incurred in the procurement of necessities. According to the sketchy facts,4 the
plaintiff hospital brought an action against the widow of a
former patient for medical expenses incurred during her
husband's last illness. The trial court found that under the
"necessaries doctrine," no cause of action existed since a
wife had no liability for her husband's medical expenses.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted certification from the
court of appeals to determine the issue of the wife's liability,
then reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for
further proceedings.5
The court declined to abolish the common-law doctrine
of necessaries despite a strong equal protection challenge
and the court's acknowledgment of the expanding economic
role of wives in the modern marriage. Instead the court
modified the doctrine to impose secondary liability on the
wife for the necessary debts of her husband in the absence of
a contract to the contrary. This note will examine the traditional doctrine of necessaries, analyze Marshfield Clinic in
the light of the most recent United States Supreme Court
decisions concerning gender based classifications under the
equal protection clause 6 and briefly review the approaches of
some other jurisdictions to the imposition of spousal
liability.
1. 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982).

2. 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980).
3. 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980).

4. The trial court was unaware of the Sharpe and Stromsted decisions and dismissed the case without making any findings. 105 Wis. 2d at 508, 314 N.W.2d at 327.
5. Specifically, the facts to be resolved were whether the plaintiff attempted to
collect from the husband's estate and whether the plaintiff expressly agreed to look
only to the husband for payment. Id at 509, 314 N.W.2d at 328.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The doctrine of necessaries, which has its roots deep in
the common law,7 was essential to ameliorate the harshness
of coverture. When a woman married, her legal personality
merged into that of her husband and in a very real sense she
ceased to exist.8 It would have been a senseless cruelty to
impose economic liability for the purchase of necessary
household and personal goods and services on one who
could neither contract in her own name nor own property.
Necessaries were variously defined to include clothes, 9 furniture and other household items,' 0 legal representation" and
medical expenses. 12 Married women's acts' 3 removed some
of the common-law disabilities, but the necessaries doctrine
remained in force.
The husband thus has the sole duty of support, and, as a
method of enforcing that duty, the common-law doctrine of
necessaries mandated that he have the sole liability for his
wife's debts incurred in the purchase of necessary items with
which he refused to provide her. 14 Eventually, the need to
establish the element of the husband's wilful refusal to provide the necessary was abolished, and the creditor had only
to show that the item was suitable for the purchaser in view
of the husband's means and the family's social position in
the community and that the item or service was reasonably
needed at the time of purchase.' 5
In 1971 the Wisconsin Legislature changed the child sup-

7. The seminal case in Wisconsin is Warner & Ryan v. Heiden, 28 Wis. 517
(1871).
8. See H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 7.1 (1968).
9. Simpson Garment Co. v. Schultz, 182 Wis. 506, 510, 196 N.W. 783,784 (1924).
10. Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 118, 299 N.W.2d 219,221
(1980).
11. Warner & Ryan v. Heiden, 28 Wis. 517, 520-21 (1871).
12. Jewell v. Schmidt, I Wis. 2d 241,250, 83 N.W.2d 487, 491-92 (1957). See also

Clark v. Tenneson, 146 Wis. 65, 67-68, 130 N.W. 895, 896 (1911) (false teeth).
13. See Annot., 15 A.L.R. 833, 843 (1921); Wis. STAT. § 6.015 (1921) (current
version at Wis. STAT. § 766.15 (1981-1982)).
14. See H. CLARK, JR., supra note 8, § 6.3.
15. See, e.g., Simpson Garment Co. v. Schultz, 182 Wis. 506, 509-10, 196 N.W.
783, 784 (1924).
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port and maintenance statutes to a gender neutral law 16
which imposed the duty to support on both spouses rather
than solely on the husband. Since the doctrine of necessaries
"arises from and is ancillary to the duty to support,"'17 it was
clear that the doctrine should be modified to reflect the

change in the support obligation.
In Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff 11the Wisconsin
Supreme Court examined the nature of the husband's obli-

gation to pay for his wife's necessary purchases made on
credit and found it to be quasi-contractual, arising by law
out of the legal relationship of marriage.' 9 It reaffirmed the
validity of the doctrine of necessaries, opining that it "serves

and proper purpose in our system of common
a legitimate
20
law."
In Estate of Stromsted v. St. MichaelHospitalof Franciscan Sisters,2' decided on the same day, the court also looked
to contract law to hold that a wife is secondarily liable,

under an implied-in-law contract, for her own necessary

purchases.22 However the creditor "seeking to recover under
the rule of necessaries must proceed against the husband as
the primarily responsible party. He may thereafter seek satisfaction from the wife as a party secondarily liable on the

quasi-contractual obligation. "23

Thus the hospital in

Stromsted seeking to recover from the wife's estate the ex16. Act of Apr. 11, 1972, ch. 220, 1971 Wis. Laws 641, 642 (amending Wis. STAT.
§ 247.08 (1969)). This is presently codified at Wis. STAT. § 767.08 (1981-1982):
If either spouse fails or refuses, without lawful or reasonable excuse, to provide
for the support and maintenance of the other spouse or minor children, the
other spouse may commence an action in any court having jurisdiction in actions for divorce to compel the spouse to provide such support and maintenance as may be legally required.
See also Wis. STAT. § 52.055 (1981-1982), which provides that "any person who, without just cause, intentionally neglects or refuses to provide for the necessary and adequate maintenance of his or her spouse, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be
fined ....
17. Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 124, 299 N.W.2d 219, 225
(1980) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). See also Paulsen, SupportRights and Duties Between Husband and Wffe, 9 VAND. L. REv. 709, 735 (1956).
18. 99 Wis. 2d 114, 299 N.W.2d 219 (1980).
19. Id at 118-19, 299 N.W.2d at 221-22.
20. Id at 119, 299 N.W.2d at 222.
21. 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980).
22. Id. at 143-44, 299 N.W.2d at 230.
23. Id at 144, 299 N.W.2d at 230.
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penses of her last illness was required to first seek satisfaction from the husband. Completing the circle, the hospital
in Marshfield Clinic, seeking to recover from the wife the expenses of the husband's last illness, was told to first seek satisfaction from his estate before moving against her.
II.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE

In Marshfield Clinic the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the equal protection 24 implications of the gender
based rule of liability not reached in Sharpe or Stromsted.
Relying on five United States Supreme Court cases, 25 the
court adopted the middle tiered standard of review for classifications grounded on sex: 26 "To satisfy a constitutional
challenge, a gender based rule must serve important governmental objectives and the means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 27
The Wisconsin court then enumerated four important
governmental objectives sought to be achieved by placing
primary liability on husbands and secondary liability on
wives for necessities:
The rule benefits families by making it more likely that
they will obtain necessary and appropriate goods and services. It enables wives to obtain credit more easily ....
It
also protects wives from economic hardship by placing primary liability on husbands ....
The rule also benefits the
providers of goods and services by assuring them greater
certainty of payment when they extend credit to families.28
The court found that the substantial relationship prong
of the standard was satisfied since the rule would result in
the "extension of credit to those who in an individual capac24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 510 n.2, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328
n.2 (1982) (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980);
Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979);
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197

(1976)).
26. See infra note 40.
27. MarshfieldClinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 509-10, 314 N.W.2d at 328. See also Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Forward. In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court.: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).

28. MarshfieldClinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 510, 314 N.W.2d at 328.
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ity may not have the ability to make. . basic purchases. 29
Recognizing the fact that the United States Supreme Court
has not upheld discriminatory treatment when men and women are similarly situated, the court employed labor statistics to demonstrate that since women earn substantially less
than men, 30 husbands and wives are not similarly situated in
an economic sense. Thus, the court justified the imposition
of primary liability on husbands because such a fixed rule
would result in the extension of credit to wives. It further
reasoned that the equal protection clause 3 1 would not be ofand
fended since empirical data established that husbands
32
wives are not similarly situated economically.
It is well established that a rule which expressly discriminates on the basis of gender is subject to scrutiny under the
equal protection clause.33 The fact that a rule discriminates
29. Id. at 509-10, 314 N.W.2d at 328 (quoting Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff,
99 Wis. 2d 114, 119, 299 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1980)).
30. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 512, 314 N.W.2d at 329.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

32. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 514, 314 N.W.2d at 330 (where the court
observed that although women who work full time earn about 60% as much as men,
the average contribution of the working wife to the family's income is approximately
one-quarter due to the number of wives who work in part time jobs).
33. See generally Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982)
(statute invalidated which denied males entrance to state-supported nursing school);
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statute holding men
alone criminally liable for statutory rape does not violate equal protection); Kirchberg
v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (state law invalidated which gave husbands the unilateral right to dispose of jointly owned community property); Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (workers' compensation statute granting benefits to
widows but not to widowers unless they can establish incapacity or dependence violates equal protection); Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (Social Security Act
provision granting benefits to families with dependent children when father is unemployed but not when mother is unemployed held constitutional); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979) (statute under which husbands but not wives might be required to pay
alimony violates equal protection); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (disparate method for calculating social security old-age benefits for men and women upheld as being compensatory); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Social
Security provision allowing benefits to widowers only if they were receiving half their
support from their wives unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (law
prohibiting beer sales to males under 21 and females under 18 violates equal protection); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (statute setting majority age of women at
18 and of men at 21 unconstitutional); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
(Social Security provision granting survivors' benefits to widows but not to widowers
violates right to equal protection); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (statute
allowing female naval officers a longer period of time to achieve promotion before
being subject to mandatory discharge held constitutional as being part of a statutory
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against men does not immunize it from scrutiny. 34 Furthermore, a gender based classification may not be used as a
proxy for a more germane method of classification.
In Orr v. Orr36 the United States Supreme Court invalidated an Alabama statute which authorized courts to impose
alimony payments on husbands but not on wives. The
Court acknowledged that the assistance of needy spouses is a
legitimate governmental objective. 7 It would not, however,
accept gender as a proxy for an individual determination of
which spouse was in fact needy. The Alabama statute
worked the "perverse result" of relieving the financially secure wife from the obligation of paying alimony to a needy
husband.38 This is clearly analogous to the Wisconsin rule
of spousal liability should the wife be the dominant wage
earner. Although she admittedly is secondarily liable, her
responsibility for necessary debts would not be triggered until her husband's assets were exhausted.
It is interesting to note that two of the four objectives
enumerated by the Wisconsin court expressly speak of aiding women.3 9 It would seem that satisfying an equal protection test by articulating a purpose favorable to one class and
then announcing a rule which would further that objective
could only be the result of circular reasoning. The rule
would always be substantially related and yet equal protection might be grossly offended. Although strict scrutiny is
not employed when classifications are made on the basis of
sex,40 the court should perhaps have looked more carefully
scheme); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (state tax exemption for widows but not
widowers constitutional as having a valid compensatory objective); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (requirement that a wife must demonstrate that her husband is actually dependent in order to claim armed forces benefits allowances
unconstitutional); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statute giving preference to
males as administrators of estates violates equal protection clause).
34. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
35. Id at 280-81. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
36. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
37. Id at 280.
38. Id at 282.
39. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 510, 314 N.W.2d at 328.
40. One of the earliest decisions addressing an equal protection challenge to a
gender based classification was the plurality decision of Justice Brennan in Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court invalidated the classification by employing strict scrutiny, finding that "sex, like race and national origin, is an immuta-
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at its avowed objective. In invalidating a state statute that
excluded males from enrolling in a state supported professional nursing school, the United States Supreme Court said:
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory
objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.
Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect"
members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior,
the objective itself is illegitimate.4
The dissent in Marshfield Clinic suggested that the actual
objective was the protection of needy spouses. 42 If this is
correct, then the question remains as to whether a more germane method of classification exists which would further the
objective. The dissent advocated a case-by-case determination which would presumably place liability on the spouse
best able to bear it.43 The majority rebutted this suggestion
claiming that such a procedure "would cause more problems
than it would solve" by creating uncertainty on the part of
the creditor as to which spouse should be liable for the
debt.44
If one accepts the dissent's proposition that a more germane method of classification is that the spouse with the
greater assets or the spouse who is the dominant wage earner
should be primarily liable for necessary debts, then the sole
remaining objective is one of administrative convenience.
The United States Supreme Court has not looked with favor
upon administrative convenience as the sole justification for
a gender based rule. 45 For example, at issue in Wengler v.
ble characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth." Id at 686. The next
year, however, the Court adopted the middle tiered standard of review by which the
disparate treatment of the sexes must further an important governmental objective
and have a "fair and substantial relation to the objective of the legislation." Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). One
can only speculate as to whether if one more Justice had joined in the Frontiero decision, there would have been any need for an equal rights amendment.
41. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336 (1982).
42. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 524, 314 N.W.2d at 335 (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting in part).
43. Id at 532, 314 N.W.2d at 339.
44. Id at 514, 314 N.W.2d at 330.
45. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality
opinion). See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-17 (1977).
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DruggistsMutual Insurance Co. 46 was a workers' compensation statute which granted death benefits to widows of wage
earners but not to widowers unless the widower could establish incapacity or actual dependence on his wife's earnings.
The Court acknowledged that empirical data could be found
to prove that husbands were more likely to be the primary
supporters of their families, 47 but still refused to uphold the
classification. Administrative inconvenience was deemed an
insufficient justification for the conclusive presumption of
dependency of the wife in order to avoid individualized determinations. "[T]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to
make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
'
by the Equal Protection Clause."48
The Wisconsin rule of spousal liability creates an even
more troublesome problem. In Wengler the classification in
favor of the payment to the wife was benign.49 However, the
offensive presumption concerning the male could be cured
by a showing of incapacity or dependency. 0 In Wisconsin
the presumption is conclusive. There is no administrative
procedure by which the male who is in fact dependent wholly or substantially on his wife's earnings can be relieved of
primary liability. It belongs to him due to the chance circumstance of being male.
The majority in Marshfield Clinic placed emphasis in
Schlesinger v. Ballard5' as authority for the proposition that
gender based classifications do not offend the equal protection clause when the sexes are not similarly situated.5 2 The
challenged statute in Schlesinger allowed a longer period of
time for female officers in the Navy to achieve promotions
46. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
47. Id at 148.
48. Id at 152 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
49. Id at 147. The Supreme Court, however, found the rule offensive to both
sexes. It discriminated against a working woman whose spouse would not be entitled
to benefits based on her earnings. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 208
(1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975).
50. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 144-45.
51. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
52. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 515, 314 N.W.2d at 331 (citing Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508).
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before being subject to mandatory discharge than to their
male counterparts. In upholding the statute, the Court
found that the unequal treatment was part of a statutory
scheme whereby female officers were not permitted assignment to aircraft combat missions or to vessels other than
hospital ships and transports. Thus, the fact that the opportunity for promotion was less for females than for males justified granting females a longer period of time to achieve
promotion. 3
There is no corresponding justification in Marshfield
Clinic - no statute to which the court can point which economically disables females or financially enhances the
male's position which would warrant the primary-secondary
dichotomy imposed on the basis of sex. Instead, the court
employed statistical data, a device which the United States
Supreme Court has viewed with disfavor in equal protection
cases: "[P]roving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative
philosophy that underlies the Equal
54
Protection Clause."
III.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

In Marshfield Clinic the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered and rejected the solutions reached by other jurisdictions5 5 in their deliberations concerning the abrogation or
modification of the common-law doctrine of necessaries.56
A.

The New Jersey Rule: Primary Liability on the Spouse
Incurringthe Debt
In Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Estate
of Baum57 the New Jersey Supreme Court examined the
modem marriage and the "evolving interdependence" of
each spouse on the other and held that marriage is a partnership in which the assets of one partner should be available to
53. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508.
54. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (footnote omitted).
55. See Annot., 11 A.L.R.4th 1160 (1982).
56. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 513-14, 314 N.W.2d 326, 329
(1982).
57. 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980). See also Comment, Domestic Relations:
Wfe's Liabilityfor Husband'sNecessary Expenses, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 638 (1981).
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pay for the other's necessary debts. 5 "However, a judgment
creditor must first seek satisfaction from the income and
other property of the spouse who incurred the debt. If those
financial resources are insufficient, the creditor may then
seek satisfaction from the income and property of the other
spouse?' 59
Citing Orr v. Orr60 the court held that the common-law
doctrine of necessaries "runs afoul of the equal protection
clause" since it grants benefits to wives who may not in fact
need them. 61 The court recognized labor statistics which established that wives earn substantially less than their husbands, but deemed that an "insufficient reason to retain a
gender based classification that denigrates the efforts of women who contribute to the finances of their families and denies equal protection to husbands. 62
The majority in Marshfield Clinic denied that its rule
denigrated the efforts of women and criticized the Jersey
Shore holding as unfairly burdensome on wives whose assets are considerably less than their husbands'. 63 It is interesting to note, however, that New Jersey gave its rule only
prospective application, believing that the parties had the
right to rely on prior law.64 The Wisconsin court did not
address this issue. However, it is obvious from the remand
instructions that the rule is retrospective, giving creditors
who have supplied husbands with necessary goods and services more than they bargained for.65
Indiana followed the New Jersey rule66 labelling the doctrine of necessaries an "anachronistic issue. . . analogous to
the current status of the black bear in Indiana. Although
once a viable and life-influencing force in our society, it is
today merely of historical interest, existing only in museums,
58.
59.
60.
61.
282-83
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. at ., 417 A.2d at 1005.
Id
440 U.S. 268 (1976).
Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. at, 417 A.2d at 1008 (citing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
(1976)).
Id (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975)).
MarshfieldClinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 513-14, 314 N.W.2d at 330.
Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. at , 417 A.2d at 1010-11.
MarshfieldClinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 509, 314 N.W.2d at 328.
Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind.App. 1982).
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works of history, and active imaginations." 67 The court,
however, applied the rule retrospectively even though the issue raised was a wife's liability for her own medical debts,
not her husband's. 68 Additionally, some states have adopted
this position by statute.69
B. Joint and Several Liability
In 1966 Mississippi adopted joint and several liability as
between the spouses for debts incurred in the procurement
70
of necessaries in the absence of a contract to the contrary.
The court noted the "clearly discernible nation-wide trend,
of both state and federal legislation, to expand rather than to
restrict the economic and personal emancipation of women
and their ever increasing participation in business and professional affairs.'
The New Jersey court considered this alternative but felt
that the immediate exposure of the assets of one spouse for
debts incurred by the other spouse would be "equality With a
vengence. 72 The Wisconsin court summarily dismissed the
theory by noting that the imposition of joint and several liability would seem "very unfair if applied to the facts of this
73
case."
Florida appears to be heading in the direction of joint
and several liability. In Manatee Convalescent Center v. McDonald,74 an action against a wife for her husband's medical
expenses, the court found most compelling the fact that the
Florida Legislature, like Wisconsin's, had changed the sup75
port and maintenance statutes to gender neutral statutes.
Thus, it held prospectively that a wife is liable for the neces67. Id at 413.
68. Id
69. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-37 (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.14
(West 1981).
70. Cooke v. Adams, 183 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1966).
71. Id at 926.
72. Jersey Shore, 84 N.J. at , 417 A.2d at 1009.
73. Marshfield Clinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 513, 314 N.W.2d at 330. See also Estate of
Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 144, 299
N.W.2d 226, 230 (1980).
74. 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
75. Id at 1357. See also Note, EqualProtectionandSpousalDebt: NovelApplication of Necessaries Doctrine, 11 STETSON L. REv. 173, 177 (1981).
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saries of her husband, but left open the question of whether
the assets of the spouse incurring the debt must be insufficient before the other spouse's liability is triggered.76
C. Equal Rights Amendments to State Constitutions
Sixteen states have adopted equal rights amendments to
their state constitutions. 7 Maryland and Pennsylvania have
considered the effect of those amendments 78 on the doctrine
of necessaries but have come to different conclusions. The
Maryland court found the doctrine clearly violative of its
equal rights amendment 79 but felt that reciprocal application, while not offensive, should be a legislative decision. 80 It
therefore totally excised the doctrine from Maryland common law and held that "neither the husband nor the wife is
liable, absent a contract, express or implied for necessaries
... "8, Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has ruled that its
mandated reciprocal application of
equal rights amendment
82
the doctrine.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the Marshfield Clinic, Sharpe and
Stromsted decisions, a provider of goods and services who
extends credit for the purchase of a necessary will know with
certainty that he must seek satisfaction of the debt from the
husband first and then the wife. However, this rule is not as
crystallized as it appears.
Presumably, the court, in fashioning its procedural rule,
76. Manatee, 392 So. 2d at 1359 n.1.
77. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 20; HAwAII CONST. art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; MD. CONST. declaration of
rights art. XLVI; MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. I; MONT.CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST.
pt. I, art. II; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; TEx. CONST. art. I,
§ 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI,
§ 1; WYo. CONST. arts. I & IV.
78. See generally Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 158 (1979).
79. Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, _, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019
(1981).
80. Id
81. Id
82. United States v. O'Neill, 478 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law). See also Kurpiewski v. Kurpiewski, 254 Pa. Super. 489, 386 A.2d 55
(1978).
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has retained the common-law definition of necessaries. But
how is the creditor to know whether or not the item is a necessary? The husband's ability to pay, the family's social position and the fact that the item is reasonably needed at the
time of purchase must all be taken into account.8 3 In Sharpe
the court found all of these elements present in a fact situation involving the purchase of a $621.50 Henredon sofa by
the wife. 84 But what if the husband was not able to pay although the other two elements were present? What if the
wife were the dominant wage earner? Should the creditor
proceed against her or has the element of the husband's
means been overruled sub silentio? Because of the court's
assertion that it was fixing its rule "in light of the general
income-producing patterns of the contemporary family," s5
the husband's ability to pay would seem to be no longer an
element.
Another area of uncertainty results from the fact that the
doctrine of necessaries is only triggered in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary.86 What constitutes such
an agreement remains unresolved. In Sharpe the wife signed
the order for the sofa by which she agreed to make the
monthly payments. 87 Furthermore, the husband had advised the local credit bureau that he would not be responsible for credit extended to his wife. 88 Apparently, the court
was not persuaded that the wife's contract constituted such
an express agreement and held the husband primarily liable.89 It will be interesting to see whether later cases develop
a different standard for husbands and wives concerning the
elements of an express agreement to look only to one spouse
for satisfaction of the debt.
83. Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 99 Wis. 2d 114, 122, 299 N.W.2d 219,223
(1980) (quoting Simpson Garment Co. v. Schultz, 182 Wis. 506, 509-10, 196 N.W.
783, 784 (1924).
84. Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d at 123, 299 N.W.2d at 224.
85. Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d
136, 144, 299 N.W.2d 226, 230 (1980) (emphasis added).
86. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 509, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328
(1982); Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d at 146, 299 N.W.2d at 231; Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d at 120,
299 N.W.2d at 222.
87. Sharpe, 99 Wis. 2d at 115-16, 299 N.W.2d at 220.
88. Id at 116, 299 N.W.2d at 220.
89. Id at 120, 299 N.W.2d at 222.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

It does appear that the court's decision in Marshfield
Clinic was sincerely motivated by a desire to ameliorate the
position of women. But does it really have that effect?
There can be no recognition of rights without a corresponding acknowledgment of responsibilities. The court advanced
one reason for the economic disparity between men and women as "a socialized tendency for women to choose lower
paying jobs." 90 A rule placing primary liability on husbands
would seem to further such a tendency. Under that theory,
if the husband is to be primarily liable, then males should
have the higher paying jobs. The United States Supreme
Court has said:
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and
burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of
reinforcing stereotypes about the "proper place" of women
and their need for special protection .... Where ... the
State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well
served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender
classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual
stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the
basis of sex.9
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in not fully bringing the
doctrine of necessaries into line with the gender neutral
maintenance and child support statutes, 92 has clearly gone
against legislative intent. There was no recognition by the
court that for the last several years the Wisconsin Legislature
has been grappling with marital property reform legislation
which would ameliorate the problem.93 Furthermore, as the
foregoing discussion indicates, the gender based Wisconsin
rule of spousal liability for necessaries is on precarious constitutional footing.94 The court says that the primary liability of husbands is subject to a standard of review stricter
than mere rationality and that this treatment is justified by
empirical data. Yet the overriding concern seems to be with
administrative convenience. The court should either have
90. MarshfieldClinic, 105 Wis. 2d at 515, 314 N.W.2d at 330.
91. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
92. See supra note 16.
93. See also Wis. S.B. 105 (1983); Wis. A.B. 200 (1983) (both providing for community property system by which spouses would be jointly and severally liable for
necessary debts).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 24-54.
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awaited the outcome of the proposed legislation or have
fashioned a truly gender neutral rule which would have
complemented the mutual duty of each spouse to support the
other.
THERESA

K. MCLAUGHLIN

